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Abstract  
During 1970 to mid 1980s, governments’ policies on basic services in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) had an almost exclusive focus on directly provided, publicly-funded. This approach 
coupled with disintegration of the economic structures resulted in steep decline in people’s 
access to basic services. Recent developments however show that policies and strategies have 
changed and so is people’s access to the services. Decentralisation within the state and from 
the state to market and to civil society has been implemented in an unprecedented fashion in 
a number of countries. In addition, the strategy of ‘unbundled’ chain of service production 
has resulted in increasingly complex institutional arrangements between governments and 
non-state actors. Using data on the provision of primary education, primary health care, 
sanitation and solid waste collection, and drinking water from a number of countries in SSA, 
this paper shows that the new approach has not only changed how basic services are 
provided and managed but has also influenced improvements in coverage and people’s 
access, though quality varies and inequalities between localities have not much declined.  
 
The paper acknowledges that given the nature of basic services with its problems of 
externalities, non-rivalry and excludability, and the socio-economic, cultural and political 
context of SSA, the central state has a crucial role to play in achieving a greater systemic 
rationality in the new approach. The central and local governments need to coordinate the 
various components that constitute the service production chain as well as multiple agents 
that are involved in delivery. This steering rather than rowing role has been minimal in SSA; 
hence the potential capacity of the new approach to achieve the highest level of accessibility 
and equity is under-utilised. The paper suggests three enabling roles that central and local 
governments need to play in order to plug the gap between the present situation and what 
may be desirable as far as the provision of basic services through multiple institutional 
modalities is concerned.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Basic services are essential human needs considered to be primarily the responsibility of the 
state and often delivered by governments. Basic services include water, sanitation and solid 
waste collection, primary education, and primary health care. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
the disintegration of political and economic structures during the 1980s brought a sharp 
decline in the provision of basic services. Shrinking government budgets meant that in many 
countries basic services functioned with insufficient resources to meet operational cost.  
Even where governments found the resources through loans and aid to provide services, 
delivery and management were still poor and large segments of the population were left out. 
Many cities in particular were described as being ‘in crisis’ following governments’ failure to 
maintain existing services let alone provide new ones (Stren & White, 1989; Amin & Lloyd, 
1990).  Studies conducted in Nairobi (Obudho, 1997; Karanja, 2003), Lagos, Benin City and 
Kaduna (Onibokun, 1989; Ogu, 1997), Kumasi (Adarkwa & Post, 2001), Kinshasa (Piermay, 
1997) and Abidjan (Attahi, 1991; Dubresson, 1997) showed that refuse was not collected and 
piles of garbage were allowed to rot in the streets. Schools were overcrowded; drains were 
choked, resulting in floods; water supply was erratic; and many people lived in overcrowded 
houses and unserviced plots.  In the rural areas where between 60-80% of the population 
lived, the situation was worse than the cities. Donor governments and their agencies 
responded to the deteriorating conditions initially by providing direct local level support but 
in most cases they selected and designed aid programmes to their own perceptions of need 
and areas of interest. Their approach also reflected short-term humanitarian measures rather 
than long term investment plans. Although, economic and political disintegration as well as 
lack of long-term investment development guidelines contributed significantly to the crisis, 
one factor that attracted major criticism was that in many SSA countries, only the 
government was formally responsible for the provision of basic services in its entirety.  
 
Recent developments in SSA however show that decentralisation within the state and from 
the state to market and to civil society are changing the institutional arrangements based on 
which basic services are provided, managed and regulated. Decentralisation has compelled 
central governments (CGs) to transfer some of their responsibilities, finances, authority and 
management to elected local governments (LGs). Subsequent application of management 
reforms (NPM)1 is leading to refocusing of government organisations on efficiency, 
effectiveness, cost reduction and quality of delivery thereby completely changing the 
traditional public sector model that government organisations are used to, separating policy, 
planning, financing, delivery, management, and regulation.  States have further began to 
unbundle the production chain of services delivery into separately managed components and 
are sharing these with non-state actors instead of behaving like a ‘dinosaur’. Through these 
changes, governments are not only encouraging multiple agents and modalities to deliver  
basic services, but are also addressing power, authority and resource imbalances arising 
between the CG and LGs, as well as between government and non-state actors.   
 
                                                 
1 This involves greater financial devolution, explicit standards of measuring performance, clear specification of 
relationships between inputs and outputs, and beliefs in the market mechanisms of competition and 
competitive tendering (Hood,1991).   
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Although the degree of success in this approach has become debateable in the literature 
(Robinson, 2007; Conyers, 2007), a clear observation is that in many African countries, CGs’ 
roles in basic services provision have fundamentally changed with LGs and non-state actors 
beginning to play a substantial role.  However, recognition of the changing role of 
governments and adoption of multiple institutional modalities in service provision are two 
things, implementation of the new approaches to deliver improved people’s access, coverage 
and quality of services is another. The questions being asked in this paper are: How are CGs 
and LGs managing the growing diversity and complexity of basic services provision in this 
new institutional set-up? In an environment where multiple institutions of central, regional, 
and LGs as well as donor agencies, international development NGOs, profit and non-profit 
organisations all contribute to influence policy formulation, planning, financing,  delivery, 
management, and regulation, how can such a web of interconnectedness be streamlined? 
How can CG which has primary responsibilities for service provision steer the unbundled 
chain of production to achieve greater coordination at a minimal cost? What new roles are 
required to be played by these multiple actors and do government agencies have the capacity 
to manage the new approach effectively so that quality of delivery will not deteriorate and 
costs rise? What lessons are there to be learned? To what extent can these lessons help to 
redirect policy formulation and implementation so as to improve the provision of basic 
services?  These are some of the issues that we will return to in our analyses of the current 
situation of basic services provision in SSA. 
 
It is important to stress the following caveats: Given the diversity of countries in SSA, it is 
difficult to have a true representation in a single paper. Hence, the countries that are chosen 
in the paper are illustrative of rather than representative. Second, for lack of detailed base 
lines the paper does not take into proper consideration the starting points of different 
countries in the application of policy and operational reforms. Third, the facts presented are 
based on authors’ own field study, collection of country reports, glossing over of (cross-
)country studies, and personal interviews and observations. As a result, there is considerable 
variation in the degree of details of various countries.  
 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides a literature review on the 
organisation of service provision and the characteristics that influence the choice of an 
institutional modality for its delivery.  Section two focuses on the four basic services, policy 
reforms, and the type of working arrangements that exist between government agencies and 
non-state actors towards basic services provision in SSA. The cases of Uganda and Ghana 
are given much focus. Section three discusses some of the outcomes of the new approach in 
terms of accessibility and coverage, quality and equity, cost implications, and coordination. 
Section four presents enabling government roles that need to be considered in an effort to 
streamline the efficacy of the new approach, while section five concludes.  
 
PROVISION OF BASIC SERVICES 
According to the literature, provision of services may be organized through markets, in 
which a variety of enterprises operate for profit; through government administration, where 
they are provided in accordance with politically determined rules and procedures; and 
through networks involving communities and self-help groups. Economic theory suggests 
that when services are organized through the market, competition requires numerous buyers 
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and sellers such that no single entity can dominate. It also requires low cost of entry and exit 
such that there are no barriers to setting up or winding down businesses. This makes the 
market competitive and marked by arm’s-length relations between buyers and sellers. It is 
doubtful, however, whether a competitive market can be the place for exchange of all types 
of services. It is argued that consumption of basic services such as sanitation and solid waste 
(SSW), primary education, and primary health care (PHC) have elements of externality, 
excludability and non-rivalry problems (public good characteristics) and thus should not be 
left to individual decisions. And because one of the roles of the state is to ensure the welfare 
of its citizens, services that depict public good characteristics should be financed by the state.  
 
In addition, government intervention has been defended by pointing to the existence of 
market failure. Market failure may exist when the nature of a service requires a natural 
monopoly for its provision (water supply system), where the necessary investment cost so 
huge yet investment return are uncertain (major highway), where the wider society would 
benefit from its provision but direct beneficiaries are unable to pay (vaccination), and where 
consumers or producers have little knowledge about the importance of the service to make 
informed choices (primary education). There is considerable literature on situations where it 
is more appropriate to keep the delivery of a service directly under public authority (Ascher, 
1987; Gidman et al., 1999; Kessides, 1993; Roth, 1987; Cointreau-Levine, 1999; Batley, 1996). 
Although these palpable reasons are quite legitimate, there have been profound attacks on 
public sector delivery. Without the discipline of competition, critics contend, the public 
sector develops bureaucratic habits and has no incentives to control costs or deliver 
effectively. The arguments on this point are also voluminous (Kettl, 1993; World Bank, 
1997, 1994). The third approach for delivering a service is through the community. The 
community approach has become necessary because of market and government failure. In 
many low-income communities, sufficiently organized community groups have considerable 
potential for managing and financing basic services (UNCHS, 1994).  
 
Nonetheless, literature contends that with technology improvement, there is an ambiguity 
over many of the arguments concerning possible market failure. That is, with technology, a 
service once described as non-excludable can become the subject of exclusion and a market 
mechanism can be introduced. Helmsing (1997:5) also argues that the category into which a 
good or service falls is not always the same in each country or historical period but depends 
on institutional factors, which may change over time and vary from country to country. 
Following these criticisms, the broad assumption that goods and services with externality, 
excludability, and non-rivalry characteristics be paid for through public funds and delivered 
by public organizations cannot be sustained in many contexts. In recent times the argument 
has shifted to services that lie between public and private goods. These goods and services 
are considered meritorious to citizens whether individuals can pay for their consumption or 
not. Examples of merit goods and services are primary education, safe drinking water, 
primary health care, and sanitation and solid waste collection generally described in this 
paper as basic services.  
 
Sanitation & Solid Waste (SSW) Collection and Disposal Services 
Sanitation refers to the management of liquid waste including sewerage systems and public 
latrines while solid waste refers to the collection, disposal and management of domestic 
waste generated by households, market places, open spaces and streets. In SSA, sanitation in 
the form of underground sewerage systems is few and usually found in old inner settlements. 
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A great number of the sewerage systems in the inner cities do not function so households 
build private septic tanks in which faecal sludge is stored for a period of time after which a 
sludge tanker empties the septic tank. The excreta are transported to a public treatment plant 
where they are available or directly into the sea untreated. Using different technologies, 
public latrines facilities are usually built in poor neighbourhoods where households can not 
afford private latrine and in market and lorry parks for people in transition from one place to 
another (Awortwi, 2006a). Kitchen wastes on the other hand are allowed to run-off and seep 
through the ground. In SSA, domestic waste has a high organic content and coupled with 
humid climatic conditions, they ensure faster decomposition. The implication is that when 
left uncollected, they turn into benign habitat for disease vectors. They are the major causes 
of diarrhoea and typhoid diseases.   
 
Primary Health Care (PHC) 
The primary health care (PHC) philosophy embodies the idea that poor health and major 
causes of hospitalization - malaria, measles, upper respiratory infection, diarrhoea, and until 
recently, HIV/AIDS- in SSA are products of environmental factors that are preventable. 
The strategic components for dealing with them include: education concerning health 
problems and methods of preventing and controlling them; promotion of proper nutrition; 
an adequate supply of safe water and sanitation; maternal & child health care including 
family planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control 
of local endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and 
promotion of essential drugs (WHO, 1978; La Fond, 1995). Improvements in PHC delivery 
in SSA involve malaria treatment, vaccines for pregnant women, refrigeration to store 
vaccines in rural areas, equipment for proper sterilisation, efficient waste management, safe 
drinking water, and education on HIV infection. 
 
Primary Education 
Primary school consists of the first years of formal structured education that occurs during 
childhood. In most countries children start primary education at the age of four to six and 
continued until they are twelve. Some educational systems may include transition to 
secondary education as part of basic education. This may extend basic education to fourteen 
years. Provision of primary education consists of building classrooms and provision of 
furniture, curricula development, employment and payment of teachers, supply of teaching 
materials and school uniform, feeding of school children, supervision and management of 
schools, and standardisation of quality of delivery.   
 
Water 
Drinking water systems usually comprise of a source of water, network of pipes, 
appurtenances (valves, bends, metering, and reservoirs) and distribution. In many SSA, 
urban water supply is mainly pipe borne while rural water supply is mainly wells, bore holes 
(with & without pump) and streams. Small town water systems consist of usually a 
mechanized bore holes, pump house, power source, pipelines, an elevated reservoir, and 
standpipes. But with increasing urbanization, many new developing areas and urban fringes 
have rural-like water supply systems.  
 
SSW, PHC, primary education, and drinking water as described above can be supplied by the 
free market, but given their characteristics, the market will fail to produce the right quantity 
or price that society needs, hence political determination is needed as an important part of 
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service production. SSW, PHC, and primary education services have externality and 
excludability problems, and on the reasons of public health concern, they have remained 
essentially public service and have over the years been provided and delivered by 
governments in SSA. In terms of water although urban and small town piped water supply is 
technically excludable and rivalry which gives a sufficient basis to be classified as a private 
good, given its nature (water is life), government is tasked to play a role to ensure survival of 
people who may be disenfranchised by the market.  However, if political determination of 
the quantity and price of basic goods and services becomes too inclusive, the size of a 
government expands while that of the market and community shrinks. Taxes and public 
policies also become expansive as part of governments’ administrative and management 
procedures.  This was one of the reasons why many states in SSA became ‘dinosaurs’ in 
basic services provision: taking on board all the responsibilities and delivered them free of 
charge, leading to large, fiscally unaffordable and unmanageable sizes of governments, got 
suffocated and eventually collapsed.   
 
 
POLICY REFORMS IN BASIC SERVICES PROVISIONS IN SSA 
In SSA, during 1970 to early 1980s governments’ policies on basic services had an almost 
exclusive focus on directly provided, publicly-funded. The inability of governments to 
budget for their maintenance led to serious deterioration. Further withdrawal of 
governments from provision as a result of structural adjustment policies led many citizens 
and households to find their own coping mechanisms either through the informal market, 
collective action or combination of parallel markets. However by late 1980s many countries 
in SSA had begun the process of decentralising the state responsibilities from CG to state 
agencies and lower levels of governments, and from state to market and to NGOs and 
community organisations. Decentralisation to the market was organised through 
privatisation and corporatisation of state organisations. This ‘first generation’ reform, the 
policy of privatisation was confined to state-owned enterprises that produced tradeable 
goods (industry, manufacturing and agricultural services) and hardly included basic services 
(Cook & Kirk-Patrick, 1995). The state perceived these services as merit goods to which 
every citizen should have equal and free access. 
 
The movements toward decentralisation within the state have oscillated between limited 
transfers of power and resources from CG to sub-national agencies of government to 
devolution of authority to elected LGs in an unprecedented fashion in a number of 
countries. Through administrative and sectoral decentralisation, LGs have been given more 
responsibilities in basic services provision.  One of the rationales for this is that LGs being 
closer to communities will be able to identify differences in citizens’ preferences in services 
delivery, be able to identify local resources needed to support service delivery, and become 
more accountable to citizens for the allocation of resources. In other words, the policy can 
generate financial, efficiency, effectiveness and quality gains in the delivery of basic services 
at the local level. Financially, the policy is attractive to governments in SSA because it 
reduces the burden on the treasury as some of the responsibilities are transferred to LGs and 
to private organisations, including community based organisations (CBOs) that may be able 
to deliver services at lower cost.  
 
The current, ‘second generation’, approach to reforming the provision of basic services has 
been through more systematic unbundling of service production. Unbundling the service 
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production chain and involves splitting ownership, control, and execution of the following 
activities: policy, planning, financing, delivery, management, maintenance and regulation. 
The task of policy is to determine the direction and guiding principles as well as overall 
objectives to achieve; planning involves setting specific objectives, assessment of alternative 
approaches, identification of available and potential actors to be involved, determination of 
funding/financing level, service delivery strategy, specification of services, determination of 
quantity and quality level to be supplied, and determination of cost implications. Financing 
involves the source and acquisition of funds, mode of acquisition, and cost recovery 
measures. Construction looks at technical and technological know-how, while delivery 
involves direct distribution of the service to end-users. The management component 
involves organizing labour and other factors of production including coordination and 
contracting of other actors in an effective and efficient manner to ensure sustainability of the 
service, while regulation focuses on standardization, entry requirement, competitive 
practices, and quality control.  In general, the failure of the state to provide basic services 
adequately created gaps, which non-state actors only partially filled. The situation then could 
be described as one in which systemic rationality was low.  This ‘second generation’ 
approach has sought to deliberately unbundle the production chain so as to formally 
accommodate multiple state actors (CG deconcentrated agencies and elected LGs) and non-
state actors (commercial private enterprises, international NGOs, donor agencies, CBOs, 
and FBOs).  
 
Again unlike the previous approach, the current strategy for reforming basic services is 
double edged-sword. On the one end, the government formally allows commercial private 
enterprises to deliver services for profit and faith based organisations (FBOs) and CBOs for 
humanitarian services in order to compensate for government own failures. Informal service 
providers are tacitly accepted and decriminalised. On the other end, governments begin to 
try to regulate the activities of non-state actors so as to ensure equity, reduce exploitation, 
control quality, and maintain minimum national standards. The recent policy direction which 
emphasizes the participation of multiple non-state actors has the support of donor 
governments through their agencies (Danida, USAID, GTZ, CIDA, and SIDA) and multi-
national organisations (World Bank and UNDP). Donors’ change of approach from 
unilateral direct local support based on their own perceptions of need and areas of interest to 
sector-wide approaches (SWAp) has given CGs a renewed role in influencing the way basic 
services are financed, provided and managed in SSA. Profiles of the current situation in two 
countries are presented. 
 
Basic Services Provision in Uganda   
Policy formulation of basic services is the responsibility of CG through the respective 
ministries in charge of health, education, and social services. There are also parallel donor 
working groups2 for health, education, water, and sanitation, whose working relationship 
with government influences policy formulation in so many areas. Government ministries are 
responsible for disseminating policy guidelines to LGs before district planning and 
budgeting processes begin. Although actual planning for basic services provision has been 
decentralised from CG to LGs, the overarching planning framework is the national poverty 
                                                 
2 The World Bank, development agencies (DANIDA, USAID, DED, JICA), international NGOs (SNV) and 
development co-operation of the Diplomatic mission and Embassies.  
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eradication action plan (PEAP) and the MDGs. As one of the few countries in Africa where  
the provision of health, education, SSW, and water have been fully decentralized to LGs, the 
CG ministries still actively play a leading role in planning. Each sectoral ministry has a five 
year national strategic plan that is supposed to be prepared in consultation with the LGs. 
CBOs and user groups participate in the planning process mainly in projects financed by 
NGOs, donors, and communities themselves. 
 
Financing basic services is the responsibility of many actors. In education for instance, 
parents are supposed to co-finance scholastic materials, uniform for their children, as well as 
contribute money and labour towards the construction of the classrooms. The CG only pays 
the salaries of teachers through earmarked funds that are transferred to LGs and also 
supplies the books.  The same financing principles apply to water, PHC and SSW services. 
Donors play a significant role in funding basic services provision. In the 1990s, Mills 
reported that donor support to health care in Uganda exceeded government spending by a 
considerable margin (Mills, 1997). Two of the biggest PHC interventions in Uganda: the 
Essential Drug Programme and the Expanded Programme of Immunisation which began as 
emergency programmes are fully funded by donors. Tables 1a, 1b & 1c show the roles that 
various actors play in the provision of PHC, primary education and drinking water 
respectively in Uganda.  
 
Table 1a: The role of multiple actors in the provision of PHC in Uganda 
Production Chain State Non-state 
 CG LG 
 
Private 
commercial 
enterprise 
NGOs Donor 
agencies 
CBOs/user 
groups 
Policy formulation x    x  
Planning x x  x  x 
Financing x x x x x x 
Delivery  x x   x 
Management  x    x 
Regulation x x     
 
Table 1b: The role of multiple actors in the chain of Primary Education provision in Uganda 
Production Chain State Non-state 
 CG 
 
LG Private 
commercial 
enterprise 
Donor 
agencies 
 
CBOs/ User 
groups 
 
Policy formulation x   x  
Planning x x   x 
Financing x x x x x 
Delivery  x x   
Management  x x  x 
Regulation x x    
 
Table 1c: The role of multiple actors in the chain of Drinking Water production in Uganda 
Production Chain State Non-state 
 CG LG Private NGOs Donor CBOs/ 
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 commercial 
enterprise 
agencies User 
groups 
Policy formulation x    x  
Planning x x    x 
Financing x x x x x x 
Construction  x x x   
Delivery  x x    
Management  x x   x 
Regulation x x     
 
The PHC sector has the largest number of non-state actors. Prominent are the village drug 
distributors who keep a consignment of malaria drugs within the community to provide first 
aid to patience. They operate in the form of health unit management committee of users, 
considered as the owners of the health facility. Village drug distributors are volunteers. With 
the exception of a few elite schools in Kampala which are patronized by the children of 
middle to high income households almost all primary schools in Uganda are in the hands of 
LGs. School management committees comprising of parents and teachers are beginning to 
assert considerable ownership and management of primary schools.  The management of 
schools by FBOs (churches) was abolished in 1997 as part of LGs reforms.  
 
In terms of water supply, in 1998 the government contracted out the management of urban 
water to a private operator (Kampala Revenue Improvement Project, KRIP) to run the 
services for 42 months (1998-2001) after years of inefficiency and mismanagement by 
national water and sewerage corporation (NWSC). KRIP is responsible for operations of 
water distribution, sales, and revenue collection but excluding water production and 
sewerage services. Many small towns have rural like water services (boreholes and wells). 
Small towns’ piped water supply are either managed by the community or contracted out to 
private companies. Maintenance is mainly by the users themselves unless major 
rehabilitations that LGs and NGOs come in to support. Rural water is operated and 
managed entirely by the user groups. Generally people do not pay directly for waste 
collection so LGs absorb the cost through the general revenue and CG transfers. In the 
capital city, the LG (Kampala City Council- KCC) has contracted out solid waste collection 
(SWC) to commercial private organizations and CBOs. LGs manage the final disposal site 
and are supposed to monitor and regulate the roles that these non-state actors play in the 
service provision.  
 
Basic Services Provision in Ghana   
Formulation of policies on basic services is the responsibility of government sectoral 
ministries. Donor agencies have parallel working groups through which they provide 
financial and technical support and also use that to influence national policies. With the 
adoption of decentralization policy in 1988, the planning function was given to LGs but 
sectoral ministries play a substantial role in actual implementation. In health, the government 
policy emphasizes the need to support PHC. As a result, basic health services like health 
posts, clinics, traditional birth attendants, and midwifery were implanted in rural areas at a 
level below the district hospital. However, attempts to re-orientate the provision from 
curative to preventive are more of an institutionalized frustration. General under-funding at 
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the primary level encourages patients to bypass sub-district facilities in favour of hospitals 
(Mills, 1995:85). 
 
In water supply, before the 1990s, the ministry of works & housing and Ghana Water & 
Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) were the two agents involved in formulating water policy, 
planning, production, distribution, management, and regulation.  As part of the reform 
process, the urban and rural water supply systems were separated in 1994. Urban water 
supply and management became the responsibility of GWSC while rural and small town 
water supply came under the responsibility of Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
(CWSA).  CWSA is an autonomous agency that formulates policies on community water and 
sanitation as well as monitoring and evaluating projects. In 1998, GWSC was converted to a 
limited liability company (GWCL) with the responsibility of providing urban water on 
commercial principles and to attract private sector participation. The restructuring of water 
supply system also resulted in the separation of production, distribution, management, and 
regulation. While GWCL remains responsible for production, distribution of water is by 
multiple commercial actors (including small water vendors). Regulation involving fixing and 
adjustment of tariff is the responsibility of Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC).  
By June 2005 a 5 year management contract had been signed by the government with a 
private organization to operate urban water supply (Nyarko, 2007). In Ghana, with the 
exception of overall policy framework (MLG, 1999), SSW provision is fully devolved to 
LGs. LGs are primary responsible for planning, management, and regulation, while 
collection and disposal are mainly by multiple non-state actors.  
 
Cost sharing between government and users has been introduced in all basic services. A user 
fee policy (cash & carry) was introduced in 1987 in all public health care facilities (Asenso-
Okyere, 1995) and in 2006 the government adopted a nationwide health insurance scheme. 
In primary education, the cost of constructing the building is the responsibility of the LG 
and Parents-Teacher Association (PTA) at the community level.  European Union micro 
projects and HIPC funds have enabled LGs to construct more primary schools and also 
provide meals to school children.  It is the responsibility of LGs to finance rural water 
provision. Generally, donor agencies including DANIDA, DfID, EU, JICA, GTZ, Dutch 
Embassy, UNICEF have provided substantial support to rural & small town water supply. 
In the urban areas, poor neighbourhoods and newly developing areas get their supply 
through hundred of water vendors or lorry tanks. In 1986, the government of Ghana 
removed subsidy for operational expenditure of drinking water and increased tariff by 500%, 
followed by 25% (1987), 25% (1988) and 15% (1989) (Gyau-Boakye & Ampomah, 2004). 
Since then water tariff takes a commercial rate. Tables 2a, 2b & 2c show the roles that 
various actors play in the provision of primary education, drinking water and SSW services 
respectively in Ghana. 
 
Table 2a: The role of multiple actors in the chain of Primary Education provision in Ghana 
State Non-state Production Chain 
CG LG Commercial 
enterprise 
Donor 
agencies 
CBOs/  
User groups 
Policy formulation x   x  
Planning  x    
Financing x x x x x 
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Delivery  x x   
Management x x x  x 
Regulation x     
 
Table 2b: The role of multiple actors in the chain of Drinking Water production in Ghana 
State Non-state Production Chain 
CG 
agencies 
LG Company commercial 
enterprises 
NGOs Donor 
agencies 
CBOs
/Users
Policy formulation x    x x  
Planning x x     x 
Financing x x    x x 
Construction   x x x   
Delivery   x x    
Management    x x   x 
Regulation x x      
 
Table 2c: The role of multiple actors in the chain of SSW Services provision in Ghana 
Production Chain State Non-state 
 CG 
 
LG commercial 
enterprises 
NGOs Donor 
agencies 
CBOs/User 
groups 
Policy formulation x      
Planning  x  x  x 
Financing  x x  x x 
Delivery  x x   x 
Management  x    x 
Regulation  x     
 
 
Community members participate in the management of primary schools through Parent’s 
Teachers Association (PTA). School management committees are established to monitor, 
supervise, and provide financial support while the Ministry of Education and Ghana 
Education Service regulate a standardized delivery of primary education through 
deconcentrated agencies at the LG level.  In terms of health, District Health Management 
Team is responsible for integrated primary health care delivery. User groups participate in 
the delivery and management of PHC care through community health agents and 
community health committees. Rural water supply is owned and managed by communities. 
Under the community ownership and management arrangement, the communities elect their 
representatives to form the water and sanitation development board (WSDB) to manage the 
water system. There are three management systems in community water supply: (a) 
community manages, operates and maintains the system; (b) community manages, operates 
while private companies undertake periodic maintenance and rehabilitation; (c) community 
owns but private sector undertakes operation and maintenance (Nyarko, 2007). By 2001, 254 
small towns with the population of 2000-50000 operate water systems in a form of 
community management (CWSA, 2003).   
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The unbundling of production chain of basic services into different small components and 
decentralisation of different responsibilities to state and non-state actors have resulted in 
many countries the development of a myriad of formal institutional arrangements generally 
referred to as public-private partnerships (PPPs) and public-community partnerships (PCPs). 
Unlike the previous approach of policy neglect and restrictive rules that criminalised non-
state actors forcing many of them to go underground, in the new partnership approach, the 
government delegates the right of participation in basic services provision to non-state 
organisations through a web of formal contractual and tacit agreements so as to retain some 
level of control in their provision. The degree of control depends on a government’s 
strategic interest, availability of non-state enterprises, and their technical and financial 
capacity. This is a partnership of roles rather than the traditional partnership that involves 
pooling of finances together to undertake a venture where profits are shared based on capital 
contribution by the parties involved. The spectrum of partnerships is wide. They include 
contracting-out, franchising, concession, and leasing (World Bank, 1994; Batley, 1996; 
Bennette et. al., 1999; Baud, 2000; Awortwi, 2003 & 2006). The language of partnerships3 is 
increasingly appearing in policy documents relating to service provision (Mills, 1997; MLG, 
1999).  Many countries in SSA have pushed ahead with implementation of public-private 
mix in the provision of basic services.  
 
In Ghanaian cities, a plethora of multiple PPPs & PCPs for the delivery of public sanitation 
and solid waste collection services has developed (see table 3). In each of these institutional 
partnerships, there are differences in the roles of the LG and non-state actors.  
Table 3: Public-Private Partnerships for delivering SSW services in Ghanaian cities 
Type of service Type of partnership arrangement Accra Kumasi Tema 
Contracting- out * * * 
Contracting-in   * 
Sub-contracting *   
Franchising * * * 
Open competition  *  
Solid Waste  
Collection 
(SWC) 
Leasing * *  
     
Affermage/management option * * * 
Build, operate & transfer (BOT) * *  
Rehabilitate, operate & transfer 
(ROT) 
  * 
Build, operate and own (BOO) * * * 
Public 
Sanitation (PL) 
Pseudo private * * * 
     
  Awortwi, 2006:229 
 
In La Côte d'Ivoire, the government has given a concessionary contract to the Societé d’eaux 
de Côte d'Ivoire (SODECI) to supply water to Abidjan and other towns. In Dolphin Coast, 
                                                 
3 Partnerships have become a part of the new international policy agenda considering the prominence that the 
subject was given as a strategy for implementing the millennium development goals (MDGs). 
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South Africa, a long-term concession in the form of PPP contract has been given to an 
international organisation to manage water supply. In Dar es Salaam, Accra, Conakry and 
Lagos, water vendors get their supply from the government water reservoir. In Malawi, 20% 
of the 770 health clinics are operated by private voluntary organizations (Olowu, 1999:132; 
Rakodi, 2003:10), while FBOs own the majority of schools, though funded by the State 
(Batley, 2006:242). In Nasarawa, near Abuja (Nigeria), the state government has entered into 
a concession contract with an indigenous private company to supply water to poor 
neighbourhoods (Larbi, et al, 2004). By 2000 there were in existence PPPs in the provision of 
water in Tanzania, Mali, Niger, Zambia, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea while 
preparations were far advanced in Togo and Congo. WUP estimates that 34 out of 48 
countries in Africa have initiated PPPs in the provision of water (WUP, 2000). In South 
Africa, Ghana, and Uganda non-clinical health services such as cleaning, catering, pharmacy, 
laundry, maintenance, printing and security has been contracted out to commercial private 
enterprises. The list goes on and on.  
 
OUTCOMES OF THE NEW APPROACH 
While there have been major shifts of policies and strategies in the provision of basic 
services, systematic documentation of evidence of improvements is very little and 
fragmented. Hence there are differences of view (optimisms, pessimisms, and cautiousness’) 
about the new direction. Current literature review by Robinson (2007) and Conyers (2007) 
have sought to put doubts on the current processes and their impact on improving basic 
services like health, education, water and sanitation. In her analyses from limited information 
on Africa (Oyugi, 2000b; Ribot, 2003; Mitullah, 2004; Crook & Manor, 1998), Conyers 
concluded that ‘decentralisation has done little to improve the quantity, quality or equity of 
public services in the region (2007:21). Our contribution here is not to critique their 
conclusions but to provide additional insights to nuance their conclusions shedding more 
light on the (highly variable) situation in SSA. 
 
Accessibility and Service Delivery Coverage  
Staring from very poor coverage in the mid 1980s to early 1990s, accessibility rates to basic 
services have been rising in a number of African countries (see tables 4 & 5).  Countries like 
Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, and Zimbabwe are performing remarkably well in terms of 
people’s access to sanitation, safe water, health services and primary education (enrolment 
and completion).  These are also the countries that have incrementally decentralised and 
have achieved moderately to high progress in three indices of political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation according to World Bank, 2003; Ndegwa & Levy, 2003 assessment 
reports.   
 
Table 4: Percentage of population with access to some basic services 
Sanitation Safe water Health services Countries 
1985 1990 2002 1985 1990 2002 1985 1991 1992-
99 
Côte D’Ivoire 50 18 29 17 43 46 - 60 - 
Ethiopia 19 4  6 16 22 25 44 55 55 
Ghana 26 43 58 56 54 79 64 76 76 
Kenya 44 42 48 27 45 62 - - 77 
Malawi 60 36 46 32 41 67 54 80 35 
 12
Mali 21 36 45 17 34 48 35 - 40 
Mozambique 20 - 27 15 - 42 40 30 39 
Senegal 55 35 52 44 66 72 40 40 90 
Uganda 13 43 41 16 44 56 42 71 49 
Zambia 47 41 45 48 50 55 70 75 - 
Zimbabwe 26 49 57 52 77 83 71 - 85 
Source: African Development Bank (2005:265); World Bank (2005:294-95) 
 
Table 5: Primary school enrolment and completion rate 
Primary School enrolment rate Primary School completion rate Countries 
1990 2001/02 1988-94 2000-04 
Côte D’Ivoire 67 80 22 39 
Ethiopia 33 64 46 51 
Ghana 75 81 61 62 
Kenya 95 96 85 73 
Malawi 68 146 36 71 
Mali 27 57 12 40 
Mozambique 67 99 28 53 
Senegal 59 75 45 48 
Uganda 71 136 - 63 
Zambia 99 79 - 69 
Zimbabwe 116 99 96 81 
Source: African Development Bank (2005:266) 
 
Do the figures, as presented in tables 4 and 5, call for optimisms, pessimisms, or 
cautiousness with regard to the second generation of reform? Although there are problems 
of determining the causal relationship between policies, strategies and provision of basic 
services, there is no doubt that the data provides evidence that accessibility to basic services 
has improved in many SSA countries during the past decade in which both unbundling and 
decentralisation strategies have been adopted. The role of donors may have contributed 
significantly in the expansion of basic services provision in Ghana and Uganda, (for instance 
through SWAPs and the use of HIPC fund for construction of primary schools and feeding 
of school children in Ghana). However, one cannot dispute the fact that the period has also 
seen improvements in financial transfers to LGs, and more recognition and acceptance of 
multiple non-state actors’ delivery of services in areas that the state had found it difficult to 
reach. While tables 4 & 5 show a general improvement in coverage, qualitative survey also 
shows that inequities in service delivery between localities have not reduced substantially. 
For instance, although about 80% of urban dwellers in Ghana have access to pipe borne 
water, only 18.8% have it in rural areas (GSS, 2000). Even within cities, there are disparities 
between poor and rich neighbourhoods, and between newly developing areas and inner 
cities. Robinson’s analyses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America show that inequities are 
widespread (Robinson, 2007). 
  
Quality of service delivery   
While accessibility and service delivery coverage have improved, a subjective indicator about 
quality does not provide encouraging results. For example, Awortwi (2004a) report card on 
SWC in Ghana shows that only 25% of residents feel that the quality of services has 
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improved as a result of contracting out delivery to commercial private companies. In the 
urban areas that about 80% of the population have access to pipe borne water, about 48% 
received it outside their premises from water vendors, tankers, and from neighbours. 
Sourcing domestic drinking water through this channel has been found to be contaminated 
by microbial germs even when the water source is uncontaminated (Clasen & Bastable, 
2003). In Uganda, enrolment in primary education has increased rapidly but there is acute 
shortage of classrooms, teachers and materials thereby affecting the quality of pupil’s early 
development in the rural districts. A study by Obwona et al, (2000:23) shows that in 5 out of 
7 LGs, the number of teachers is between 25-40% below the satisfactory level; 8 out of 10 
LGs have only 40-50% of quality health services; while sanitation reveals a quite depressing 
picture, with most of LGs scoring below 60%. In poorer areas of Dolphine Coast in South 
Africa, PPPs have resulted in reduction in service levels with disconnections of house water 
pipes. These pipes have been replaced by communal standpipes.  
 
One other cause of poor quality service delivery resulting from the new approach is LGs 
inability to manage PPP modalities to promote accountability. In Dolphine Coast, the 
Borough council that is responsible for managing the PPP contract did not have the capacity 
to effectively regulate private delivery resulting in the problem (Delay et al, 2004). 
Collaborative approach requires carefully structured contractually based relationship with 
clear responsibility and accountability between state and non-state agencies. However, in a 
number of countries, the rush to implement new approaches has led to less attention being 
placed on developing capacities to monitor and supervise. Not much attention is given to 
the government agency in charge of undertaking the job in terms of resources, material 
transfers, and training.  With poor salaries, commercial private agents easily manipulate the 
already unmotivated government monitoring officers. The absence of logistics not only 
breeds indifference to monitoring staff, but it also provides opportunity for non-state actors 
to get away with shoddy work. In Malawi, Batley reports that where Save the Children Fund 
involves communities in the recruitment and discipline of teachers, local accountability 
seems to produce better results in school performance (Batley, 2006). In many countries 
LGs have not systematically involved service users and groups in monitoring to complement 
that of government. 
 
Cost savings to governments 
Literature on PPPs provides evidence that where they are effectively implemented, 
competitively contracted services leads to cheaper cost to government (McDavid, 1985; 
Domberger et.al., 1986; Kettl; 1993:160; Proust, 1997). The OECD survey of experiences in 
Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and the UK showed that savings from contracting out 
ranged from 5% to 50%, although Keating’s report a year later showed 20% (OECD, 1997; 
Keating, 1998). However, results from the Ghanaian study show that the new approach has 
rather led to significant cost increases per units. LGs in Accra and Kumasi were paying more 
than twice the cost of SWC than they used to before contracting out. This came about as a 
result of collusion and corruption by government staff that affected contract prices. In the 
two cities because LGs’ own revenue generation was not enough to cover the corrupt deals, 
CGs had to come to their aid and financed about 75% of the cost of private delivery from 
1996 to 2001. In addition, LGs contracted SWC out to one private company (CCWL in 
Accra, and KWML in Kumasi) and created a long-term private monopoly agreement. The 
contracts were not competitively tendered. Since one of the main objectives in reforming the 
system was to reduce CG’s annual deficit, the PPP contracts were prematurely abrogated and 
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a new round of contracting-out procedure was conducted. Furthermore, contracting out of 
SSW services to non-state actors rarely accompanied by a significant reduction in LG staff. 
LGs still have on their payrolls a large number of unessential personnel because the CG has 
not devolved to LGs the power to hire and fire workers (Awortwi, 2004b).  In Uganda, 
KRIP was awarded the contract of managing water supply in Kampala without competitive 
tendering. In her review of other studies in Africa, Conyers (2007) also shows that the new 
approach has not led to significant cost savings to government except in cases where it has 
coincided with a drastic reduction in the quality of services delivery.  
 
One other objective sought from decentralisation is the possibility to transfer some of the 
cost of financing basic services to users and households so as to reduce the treasury’s 
burden. However, in SSA, majority of households have incomes that fall below the poverty 
line when simply defined as earnings below US$1 a day. In Ghana, surveys conducted by 
AMA/Colan Consult (1995) and Ghana Living Standards Survey (1987) show that many 
low-income households spend an average of 66.4% of their meagre income on food. Most 
users, in this income category, may want to exercise prudence in spending the remaining 
33%. So given the opportunity, they would spend nothing on basic services such as 
sanitation, SWC, and PHC even if the fee was small. There is therefore a weak connection 
between service provision and user fees. Although application of users fees in financing 
basic services have occurred as part of the reforms, in Uganda, Ghana and Senegal where 
service coverage has seen remarkable improvement, very few areas are fully financed by user 
charges. People in rural areas regard water supply as free and will only contribute when there 
is breakdown in the infrastructure. In Kampala (Uganda), even high income households and 
neighbourhoods do not pay for SWC.  
 
Weak coordination in the new approach 
Although there are efforts to unbundle the production chain of basic services and allocate 
appropriate responsibilities to different actors, in many countries, there are considerable 
overlaps, ambiguity, and fragmentation in the present arrangements. Clear allocation of 
responsibilities between state agencies at central and local levels on one hand and between 
state and non-state actors on the other is weak and sometimes ineffective, dysfunctional and 
costly. In Ghana there is no clear responsibility between sectoral ministries and agencies and 
LGs authorities as far as health and education are concerned. While LGs are responsible for 
planning, delivery and management of clinics and primary schools, education and health 
operate under deconcentrated CG agencies under the ministries of education and health 
respectively. Public officers in these two sectors are accountable not to LG but to CG 
ministries. In Uganda, although education and health are fully devolved to LG, the CG 
through the ministries still play a substantial role to influence local planning, financing and 
regulation. While there is no doubt that given the nature of basic services to society, it is 
necessary that CGs continue to play a role in achieving greater systemic rationality in the 
various unbundled components of the production chain, the act of steering leaves much to be 
desired. It has needlessly become costly as decentralisation of state responsibilities to LGs and 
non-state actors often lead to creation of new organisations and functions with high 
administrative and overhead costs. For instance, since the inception of major 
decentralisation policy, Ghana has moved from 65 LG units to 138, while Uganda from 13 
to 57. This trend in itself has probably more to do with the politics of decentralisation than 
with efficiency and effectiveness of basic service delivery. 
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Government relationships with commercial private enterprises and non-profit organisations 
are also weak and haphazard. In many countries PPPs & PCPs are already been implemented 
without a coherent national framework and strategy for systematic involvement and 
regulation. A study by Collignon and Vezina (2000) in ten cities found a striking absence of 
any form of dialogue between government authorities and non-state actors in the provision 
of water and sanitation. The purchaser-provider split management policy which enables a 
government to separate its demand-side functions (planning the service, defining the work to 
be undertaken by  non-state actors, contract preparation, tendering procedures, and 
fulfilment of contractual obligations) from the supply side (delivery of services), has been 
implemented haphazardly. As a result, in the spirit of the system there is little or no 
accountability between the state as a major purchaser of basic service and non-state agents as 
providers. Governments incompetence in steering the process (collecting data to facilitate 
contracting process, negotiating contracts, setting service standards, drawing requisite 
budget, tendering competitively, and measuring the performance of contracted services) has 
hampered an otherwise potentially new approach to achieve the higher level of access, 
equity, and cost reduction in service provision. In the urban water provision in Ghana, small 
enterprises are beyond any kind of strict regulation by the National Standard Board. A study 
by Kumaranayake et al, (2000) in Tanzania and Zimbabwe on ways of regulating health 
services found that where governments tried to regulate commercial enterprises, existing 
regulation is couched in legal frameworks that have failed to keep pace with realities. 
Governments often neglect them while the enterprises in return treat government with 
suspicion, distrust and scepticisms. In undertaking LG contracts in Ghana, commercial 
private enterprises face risks of arbitrary termination of contracts and reluctance by LGs to 
enact and enforce regulatory rules that will support their operations.  
 
NGOs/CBOs/FBOs provide about one-third of health care in Africa. In many countries, 
they cater specifically for the needs of the more deprived rural areas. In Tanzania, private 
non-profit hospitals account for about 50% of all hospitals and about 3% of all health 
centres (Castrol-Leal, 2000:67); Churches contribute 40% of the clinical needs of the 
population in Ghana (Gilson, et al, 1997:281). Consequently, they have received increasing 
levels of funding from central and LGs. The irony is that while formal contracts are usually 
discussed in relation to government contractual relationship with commercial private 
enterprises, the same emphasis is not put on non-profit organisations. An informal mutual 
agreement rooted in public official circulars is usually the terms of reference. In Malawi, 
Batley reports of loose agreements between the government and Christian Hospital 
Association (CHAM) for the latter to provide health services in areas where there are no 
government health care centres. They have operated for decades on the basis of trust 
(Batley, 2006:248). In Accra (Ghana), AKCPP, La Mansaamo Kpee and Manhean Sanitation 
Enterprises Committee have provided SSW services in the form of community management 
for over a decade without any formal written contract with the LGs. The informal nature of 
agreements between non-profit organisations and governments is reflected in their 
unspecified or indefinite length of relationship, irregular revisions and lack of accountability 
for the funds received (Gilson et. al. 1997). In Ghana and Zimbabwe where governments 
have provided financial support to FBOs to deliver health care services, Russell et al, (1997) 
and Smithson et al, (1997) provide evidence that government failed to clearly specify the 
quantity and quality of services to deliver but have counted on the goodwill and trust. Where 
governments have seriously collaborated with non-profit organisations, it has been through 
the facilitation of donor agencies. Quite often the government’s role ends the moment 
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donor support ceases. Batley provides example of family planning clinics in Malawi (Batley, 
2006: 247). While PHC was introduced at the instance of donors, the government has taken 
less interest in taking responsibility for it.  In almost all SSA, there is little evidence of formal 
contracting of basic education service delivery between government and non-profit 
organisations (LaRocque, 2005). Batley argues that the relationship between government and 
non-profit organisations in health and education provision in Africa has been a constant 
shift in the rules of the game between collaboration, laissesz-faire, and control with the 
greatest ambivalence in education sector where the state has sought but failed wholly to 
assert its dominance (Batley, 2006:243).  
 
 
ENABLING GOVERNMENTS: THE MISSING LINK IN THE 
TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
To achieve maximum synergy and complementarities in the new approach, decentralisation 
and unbundled processes of service production need to be complimented by an enabling 
government approach (Helmsing, 1997, 2002). The latter is missing from the transformation 
process in SSA.  The enabling role requires CGs to run less but manage better and 
differently through institutionalisation of three new responsibilities: (i) setting clear national 
policies to govern the ‘unbundled chain’ of service production; (ii) institutionalising 
structures that will regulate the organisation of the market of basic services; (iii) facilitating 
efforts of LGs & non-state actors to plan and implement programmes and activities within 
such networks.  
 
Enabling CG Roles in ‘Unbundled’ Chain of Service Production & Multiple 
Institutional Modalities   
Given the fact that the state retains the overall responsibility for service coverage, quality, 
and equity, the first task required by the CG in the new approach is to draw clear national 
policies in three areas: (i) policy objectives to be attained in the provision of each of the 
services; (ii) policy on all the various components that constitute the production chain; and 
(iii) policy on roles and responsibilities between state agencies, LGs and non-state actors. It 
is on the basis of these policies that both state agencies (LG and deconcentrated 
departments) and non-state actors are restricted, allowed or enabled and coordinated in a 
systemic rational way. Policy ambiguities often lead to non-state actors’ role being described 
as informal (sometime illegal) however crucial they are in African societies. In multiple 
institutional partnerships, accountability is better enforced when each of the actors has a 
clear sense of allocation of work and responsibility to provide. Once policy guidelines on 
these three areas are clearly drawn, planning, delivery and management should be left to LGs 
and non-state actors to implement based on local circumstances and context.  
 
The second task of an enabling government that should follow policy formulation is a 
comprehensive regulation of the demand and supply sides of the service market for all 
(potential) service providers. Although the market of basic services in SSA is characterised 
by easy free-riding; difficulties in cost recovery; and large externalities, the CG can organise it 
in such a way that a regulated market can be promoted. A flexible regulatory framework that 
will promote competition in the supply side is the key issue here. A widespread conclusion 
from a number of studies in service improvement is that introduction of competition has a 
more significant effect on performance than change of ownership (Bartley, 1996:749; 
Awortwi, 2003:299). Restructuring the market to create competition involves issuance of 
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licenses/permits to actors, the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering of 
government services, writing of short-term contracts, institutionalisation of service delivery 
standards, monitoring and performance assessment, reporting, and sanctions for 
underperformance. It is important for CGs to set national standards and procedures based 
on which these activities are organised. Although there is a risk that by undertaking this 
broad regulatory framework CG’s involvement remains strong, it is important for example 
that LGs should create competition and not monopoly. For instance in the provision of 
SWC, the CG can institutionalise a regulatory fiat which will compel LGs to divide their 
jurisdiction into smaller areas and allow many small enterprises to bid for the right to deliver 
instead of awarding contracts to a single contractor. By so doing, CGs help to create 
competition in the service for an area even when there is no competition in the service in the 
area. In SSA, many small enterprises have the capacity to deliver services in small 
jurisdictions. Under the new management principles, competition in service delivery can still 
take place within government departments through contracting-in where CGs sign 
performance agreements with LGs and deconcentrated departments and their officers. In 
contracting-in, the LGs delivery role should be separated from regulation (monitoring & 
supervision).  
 
The third role of an enabling CG is facilitating efforts of LGs and non-state actors to 
perform their roles effectively. The recognition that CGs have given to LGs and non-state 
actors as far as delivery of basic services is concern is fine but that is not enough. It is time 
that CGs move beyond recognition to play facilitative roles (Awortwi, 2004b). The first 
facilitative role will require substantial decentralization of CG powers, financial resources 
and human capacity to LGs. Serious commitment to decentralization by making laws, 
designing programmes, and following them through and not just political statements. One of 
the problems that put constraints on the new approach to sustaining improvements in 
accessibility and service delivery coverage is inadequate funding. The funding problem 
comes from the way decentralisation policies are implemented. It has resulted in the transfer 
from CG to LGs services, which are difficult to charge for (unfunded mandates). An 
enabling government will have to transfer adequate financial resources to LGs. 
Decentralisation of basic services to LGs without necessary fiscal transfers disables LGs 
effectiveness in the new approach. While it is true that the more non-state actors are 
involved in basic service delivery, the larger the service delivery coverage and accessibility, 
the inability of LGs to pay commercial non-state enterprises for services provision is leading 
to uneasiness in PPP approaches. If services are provided through CBOs without LG 
financial support, sustainability of the modality gets truncated. Where LGs services are 
contracted out to commercial private enterprises, inadequate financial capacity to pay often 
leads to poor quality delivery and or exclusion of some users. Not only CG financial 
transfers to LGs need to improve but also CGs should give authority to LGs to charge and 
raise fees where necessary to recover the cost of service provision in their jurisdictions. In 
much of SSA, fiscal decentralization policies are weak with CG controlling far substantial 
part of financial resources and authority.   
 
A fourth facilitative role of the CG is technical assistance and training of human resources 
and leadership at LG level to institutionalise and manage PPPs and PCPs . Given that crucial 
responsibilities in the chain of service production (planning, management, and regulation) 
have been given LGs and delivery to multiple non-state actors, there is a need for LGs 
officers to acquire new technical and managerial competences than is traditionally provided 
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for in public administration training. These new responsibilities are more complex and 
demanding than the act of delivering. The new competences training requirements are 
negotiation, procurements, contract design, PPPs, stakeholder analysis, performance 
assessment, data collection, and evaluation techniques (Awortwi, 2006b). There is also the 
need for CG to facilitate leadership training at LG levels. LG leadership or Mayorship needs 
to become proactive in leveraging resources from non-state actors in their jurisdiction. 
Rather than simply signing contracts with non-state actors and assuming that basic services 
delivery would improve, LG leadership should be trained to become political entrepreneurs 
and transformational leaders who spend more time collaborating with non-state actors and 
integrating their programs to LG. A good example of such enabling role would be the 
Community Water & Sanitation Agency created in 198 in Ghana to assist LGs and rural and 
small town water boards. A recent study has shown that small town water boards on average 
outperform the privatised National Ghana Water Company Limited (Nyarko, 2007) 
 
Enabling LGs Roles in ‘Unbundled’ Chain of Service Production & Multiple 
Institutional Modalities 
Given the proximity of LGs to localities and service delivery points, changes in CG roles 
would also require cascading effects on the roles of LGs. Planning, co-financing, delivery, 
management, and regulation (monitoring & reporting) will become the new roles of LGs. 
 
Planning for basic service production 
Planning towards improving people’s access to and equity in basic services would require a 
stock-taking approach in basic services in LGs’ jurisdictions. A scalogram analysis can show 
which community has access to a particular service, the degree of quality being provided, the 
type of service providers, determination of their capacity and needs, estimation of 
funding/financing requirements per capita, assessment of users’ ability and willingness to co-
finance delivery, and a determination of cost implications. This initial assessment is necessary 
for a coherent piece-meal planning and development of basic services at the local level. 
Planning at the local level will then form the basis of national sectoral plans instead of the 
other way round. 
 
Co-financing basic services provision at the local level  
While it is true that LGs are constrained by inadequate CG transfers, sustainability of current 
improvements is bound to fall if there are no improvements in effort by LGs to raise local 
revenue to complement CG transfers. In many countries, CG transfers constitute the largest 
proportion, about 81.3% in Uganda; 64% in Ghana, 60% in Malawi, and 80% in Ethiopia.  
In Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, as in many other countries in SSA, LGs efforts in local 
revenue mobilisation have declined as CGs began to transfer funds to finance LGs activities. 
Furthermore, there are doubts on the effective allocation of LG own revenue. In Uganda 
wage bill constitutes more than 50% of LG expenditure while cost of services delivery 
constitute only 21% (Obwona, et.al., 2000:19). Once a CG gives authority to LGs to charge 
and raise fees, there is a need for LGs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
revenue collection methods. LGs can improve revenue collection if they also contract out to 
agents (either in-house or to commercial enterprises) and provide incentives to those who 
collect the revenue in the form of commissions. In Kampala, Uganda this has improved 
substantially the collection of parking fees in the city centre. Evidence from Tanzania 
(Fjeldstad, 2001) also suggests that when councillors are fully involved in preparing councils’ 
budget, their attitude to tax collection improves.  
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Delivery of Services: Switching between Multiple Agents and Modalities 
The current approach in service delivery involves multiple agents of public, private and 
community delivery and modalities of partnerships. Each modality has inherent strengths 
and weaknesses, and therefore works better in different circumstances and contexts. To 
determine which of the partnership modalities to use, LGs need to consider two important 
criteria: (i) users’ ability and willingness to pay and (ii) LGs’ capacity to manage multiple 
actors and partnerships. The matrix below maps this for the delivery of SSW.  
    
       LG Capacity to Manage 
       HIGH    LOW 
 Users Ability &  HIGH  I  II 
Willingness to Pay   
     LOW  III  IV 
 
I Public/Private franchising  
II Private Franchising 
III Contracting-out to commercial enterprises  
IV Contracting and Franchising to CBOs 
  
When users’ willingness to pay survey reveals how much users can pay for a service, there 
will be a need to consider switching a modality vis-à-vis full or partial cost recovery. Private 
sector franchising are better options for middle- to high-income areas where willingness to 
pay is high4.  Contracting out then becomes the choice modality where users’ ability and 
willingness to pay is low. Delivery is provided either through semi-autonomous LG 
department or through commercial private enterprises and paid for through the general tax 
revenue. Where many users have a tendency to dump indiscriminately, community-based 
delivery where users themselves are members of the organization is a better option. The 
assumption is that members will co-ordinate, check and enforce behaviour on a face-to-face 
basis. While development actors are increasingly recognising the importance of community 
based approaches to basic services delivery in low-income areas, LGs have not done much 
to facilitate their efforts. In Ghana, community delivery of SWC showed better quality at 
lower price than commercial private and LG direct delivery yet LGs did not find it 
appropriate to support community organisations (Awortwi, 2003). While LG have tried to 
assist CBOs, it has been benevolence, centred on occasional material support in the form of 
donations rather than a policy of enablement. UNCHS research conducted by Helmsing & 
Wils (1999) shows that community management needs an enabling framework of technical 
and institutionalised support policies and programmes. Community management approach is 
enabled and become more sustainable when CBOs have direct contractual relationship with 
LGs to provide services. In practical terms, LGs would be expected to design into details all 
                                                 
4 Public information and educational awareness may positively influence people’s attitude towards demand for 
the service and may change their unwillingness to pay attitudes.  
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the tasks needed to implement the activity and hand them over to the CBO for execution.  
Here technical capacity is the essence and their ability to mobilise and organise collective 
action is not crucial (Krishna, 2003). Where CBOs play sub-contracting role, the expected 
enabling role by LG would be to recognise the jurisdictions in which they operate, enact by-
laws to limit users’ free-riding behaviour, enforce sanction for non-compliance, and pay for 
the services that CBOs deliver in cases where direct fee collection is impossible (Helmsing, 
2002). 
 
The second considerable factor will be the capacity of the LG to manage a particular 
modality. Contracting out tends to have paradoxical results, which suggests that the LG 
should have substantial capacity to regulate and monitor before undertaking it (Awortwi, 
2004b). 
 
Management of Multiple Agents and Modalities of Service Delivery  
As LGs begin to adopt policy enablement on multiple modalities of partnerships with non-
state actors, formal written contract should as much as possible be placed at the centre and 
should form the basis of defining the relationship between themselves and non-state actors 
as far as the provision of basic services is concerned. Under no circumstance should LG 
relationships with non-state actors be based on trust alone. Although non-profit 
organisations (FBOs & CBOs) are less likely to behave opportunistically, being under 
contract with LGs helps to improve accountability upwards and downwards.  
 
Regulating Service Quality and Implementation of Clear Rules of Multiple Partnerships 
LG regulation of service delivery must cover all three dimensions: (i) Monitoring & 
supervision of quality of services delivery by agents based on appropriate national standards. 
This upward responsibility to the state is based on the fact that LGs need to account for the 
financial transfers they receive from CG and the fact that there is the need to reduce 
inequities in service quality among localities. (ii) Implementation of transparent rules of 
contracting that ensures competition among agents and between partnership modalities. This 
will involve implementation of open competitive bidding, contract management procedures, 
regular monitoring and reporting, and strict enforcement of sanctions for under-
performance. (iii) Delegation or involvement of citizens/users in monitoring service delivery 
by multiple agents will help improve accountability upwards to LGs and downwards to the 
community.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have presented and discussed issues concerning the provision of basic 
services. We have shown that the mode of provision has undergone manifold changes in 
SSA. In many sectors the coverage has improved as more people enjoy access to basic 
services. The ‘dinosaur’ roles of the state have been unbundled as more non-state actors are 
now formally partnering state agencies to deliver services. The process has received 
enormous support from donors through SWAps. Although decentralisation within the state 
(from CG to LGs) and from the state to NGOs/FBOs/CBOs has resulted in multiple 
institutional partnerships, systemic rationality is still low. Hence, the potential of the second 
generation approach to achieving higher service coverage and equity is underutilised in SSA. 
Calling the results from this new approach ‘half-empty’ rather than ‘half-full’ as some 
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commentators and analysts would like to, and to spin the problem around the general 
characteristics of African states, which hamper any form of service delivery, whether 
centralised or decentralised, is unhelpful. Such propositions do not provide justice to many 
of the positive changes that are taking place in SSA. However, to be able to exploit the full 
potential of the new approach, there is a need to shift gear and fix many of the problems 
that hamper its effectiveness. This means developing enabling roles for central and LGs. The 
involvement of non-state actors and institutionalisation of multiple institutional modalities 
does change the role of governments from rowing to steering and enabling others to row in 
unison. This refers to policy formulation, regulation and facilitation. We have discussed the 
new enabling government roles and suggested further step-by-step procedures on how to 
proceed.  
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